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ABSTRACT 
The question of nation-building has always been a central issue in Malaysian politics. Whilst the coun- 
t y  has been able to sustain stable politics since the 1969 racial tragedy, spawning two decades rapid 
socio-economic development until the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the project of nation-building re- 
mained a basic national agenda yet to be fully resolved. This short paper investigates the delicate 
process of nation-building in Malaysia in the post 1970s, especially in the context of the vision of 
constructing the Bangsa Malaysia or united Malaysian nation enshrined in Mahathir ’s Vision 2020 
project which was introduced in 1991. 
The aim of the paper isfirstly, to highlight the underlying socio-political parameters that shaped and 
influenced the politics of nation-building in the country, and secondly, to explore the viability of the 
project of Bangsa Malaysia in the context of the daunting challenges involved in the process of nation- 
building. The paper contends that, based on the Malaysian experience, the potent interplay between the 
forces of ethnicity and nationalism constitute the crux of the problem in the politics of nation-building 
in Malaysia. This dialectic it is argued, stemsfiom the prevalence of the varying ‘nationalisms’ within 
and across ethnic groups. These phenomena have not only shaped the pattern of ethnic political mobi- 
lization in the countv, but above all, laid the most complex set of obstacles in the path of the project of 
nation-building. 
The paper argues that the project of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia therefore, can be seen as sign$- 
cant attempt by the state to reconcile the competing ‘nationalism ’. It can also be considered as an 
attempt to consolidate Malay nationalism and cultural pluralism, thus promoting the development of 
‘civic nationalism ’ orheation of ‘a supra-ethnic ’ national identiv. The ‘nation ’, therefore, is depicted 
as a ‘mosaic of cultures’, but with a strong fervour of MaIay nationalism. However, the viability of the 
envisaged project is yet to be tested. 
The concept itself is still vague to many people and the challenges ahead are enormous, involving 
political, economic, socio-cultural and religious issues. Indeed the project risks becoming the ‘latest’ in 
the series of competing notions of ‘nation-of- intent’ circulating in Malaysia. The paper contends that 
whilst, to some extent, the socio-political landscape of MaIaysian society has been rapidly changing, 
especially in the past two decades of Mahathir ’s reign, ethnicity still pervades Malaysian political life. 
The paper probably difers from many previous studies on nation-building in Malaysia, which have 
’ I have completed a study on the politics of nation-building in Malaysia for my Doctoral Degree at the University 
of Leeds, England in 1999. This paper is basically the gist of the thesis. 
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mainly focused on either the historical dimensions or those which have examined the impact of key 
national policies. It is hoped that this briefpaper would be able to contribute towards broadening the 
perspective in the analysis of ethnic relations and nation-building in Malaysia, thus, deepening the 
understanding of Malaysia politics and society. 
AJ3STRAK 
Persoalan pembentukan negara sentiasa rnenjadi isu utama dalam politik Malaysia. Walaupun negara 
ini telah memastikan kestabilan politik berterusan semenjak tragedi perkauman 1969, sepanjang 
sepanjang dua dekadpembangunan sosio-ekonorni yangpesat hingga Krisis Ekonomi Asia I997, projek 
pembentukan negara kekal menjadi agenda asas negara yang belum dapat disempurnakan sepenuhnya. 
Artikel pendek ini menyelidik proses pembentuk negara yang rurnit ini di Malaysia pasca 1970an, 
terutamanya dalam konteh wawasan untuk membentuk Bangsa Malaysia atau satu negara Malaysia 
yang bersatu seperti yang tertera dalam projek Wawasan 2020 oleh Dr Mahathir yang diperkenalkan 
pada tahun 1991. 
Tujuan pertama artikel ini untuk menerangkan parameter sosio-ekonomi yang wujud dalam membentuk 
dan mempengaruhi politik pernbentukan bangsa di negara ini, dan kedua, meninjau keupayaan dayamaju 
projek Bangsa Malaysia dalam konteks cabaran berat yang dihadapi dalam proses pembentukan negara 
ini. Artikel ini berpendapat, berdasar pengalaman Malaysia, hubungan timbal-balik utama di antara 
pengaruh etnisiti dan nasionalisme merupakun teras masalah politik pembentukun negara di Malaysia. 
Dailetik ini dikatakan lahir dari kewujudan kepelbagaian ‘nasionalisme ’ di dalam dan di antara 
kumpulan etnik. Fenomena ini bukan sahaja membentuk pola pengembelingan politik etnik di dalam 
negara ini, tetapi Iebih penting lagi, telah meletakkun satu set cabaran yang paling kompleks dalam 
landasan projek pembentukan negara. 
I 
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Artikel ini berpendapat projek pembentukan Bangsa Malaysia patut dilihat sebagai satu percubaan 
penting oleh pemerintah untuk mengenemukan ‘nasionalisme ’ yang bersaing ini. la juga boleh dianggap 
sebagai satu percubaan untuk mengukuh nasionalisme Melayu dan pluralisme budaya, hingga 
mempromosikan pembangunan ‘nasionalisrne sivil ’ atau pembentukan identiti nasional kupra-etnik ’. 
Justeru itu, ‘negara ’ dipamerkan sebagai satu ‘mosaik pelbagai budaya ’, tetapi dengan nasionalisme 
Melayu yang kuat. Namun demikian, keupayaan dayamaju projek yang dibayangkan ini masih belum 
‘diuji. ‘ 
Konsep inipun kasih lagi kabur dipandangan kebanyakan orang ramai dun cabaran mendatang adalah 
besar yang melibatkan isu politik, ekonomi, sosio-budaya dan agama. Sememangnya projek ini berisiko 
menjadi ‘ha1 terbaru ’ dalam siri persaingan tanggapan tentang ‘negara idaman berlegar di Malaysia. 
Artikel ini berpendapat, walaupun pada satu segi, landskap sosio-politik masyarakat Malaysia telah 
mengalami perubahan yang cepat, terutama dua dekad pemerintahan Dr: Mahathir, etnisiti masih 
mencorak kehidupan berpolitik rakyat Malaysia. Artikel ini mungkin berbeza dengan kajian yang lepas 
tentang pembentukan negara di Malaysia, kerana mereka telah memberi penumpuan sarna ada pada 
dimensi sejarah atau ke atas tinjauan kesan dasar utama negara yang tertentu. Diharapkan artikel 
yang ringkas ini dapat menyumbang ke arah memperluaskan lagi perspektif analisis perhubungan 
etnik dan pembentukan negara di Malaysia, sekaligus memperdalamkanlagi kefahaman Fnta tentang 
politik dan masyarakat Malaysia. 
The question of ethnicity and nationalism have drawn enormous interest from scholars of varied disciplines in the 
social sciences since years that may not possible to be fully listed here. To name a few were Brown (1 999), Mcrone 
(1 998), Nairn (1997), Hutchinson and A.D. Smith (1997) and so forth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies on ethzlcity and nationalism have been 
growing significantly in recent years despite the 
new interest in social sciences concerning ideas 
of postmodemism, globalization, and market liber- 
alization, as well as regional political and eco- 
nomic cooperations.’ Ethnicity continues to be 
crucial, and to constitute one of the most promi- 
nent features of modem society. As Horowitz 
(1985:13) puts it: 
The increasing prom in ence of ethnic 
loyalties is development for which 
neither statesmen nor social 
scientists were adequately prepared. 
In many divided societies, managing eth- 
nic conflict and promoting national integration 
continues to be at the centre of politics. This is 
bound to be true as far as Malaysia is concerned. 
As a plural society, nation-building has always 
been the greatest challenge for Malaysia. Nation- 
building basically refers to a process of construct- 
ing national identity that could accommodate eth- 
nic pluralism while simultaneously inculcating an 
overarchng sense of nationhood. It is usually a 
process associated with plural societies, Although 
since the 1969 racial riots Malaysian plural soci- 
ety has been able to absorb various threats to its 
political stability, the ultimate aim to build a 
‘united Malaysian nation’ is yet to be achieved. 
The politics of nation-building in Malay- 
sia is’ basically the politics of mediating identi- 
ties. Indeed, th ls probably was the heart of the 
issue for many countri3s struggling with problems 
and challenges stemming from the politics of 
ethnicity and nationalism. As Clive J. Christie 
(1998) asserts, ‘At the heart of any discussion of 
the nation and nationalism lies the issue of iden- 
tity’ (p. 3). For Shamsul A.B. (1993,1996a) the 
politics of identity in Malaysia illustrates the pre- 
vailing contradictions of various notions of nation- 
of-intent2 both inter and intra ethnic groups. The 
central question to ask is how Malaysian political 
system has been coping with it and to which di- 
rection will the ideology of the Bangsa Malaysia 
introduced by Dr. Mahathir in 1991 seek to take 
Malaysians into the new millennium? And of more 
crucial is to what extent could this be a successful 
endeavour? 
While the importance of historical factors 
has to be acknowledged, this paper embarked from 
the premise that the dialectic between ethnicity 
and nationaIism is crucial to apprehend the poli- 
tics of nation-building in Malaysia. Ethnicity 
characterised the very basis of Malaysian politics. 
Tlus is reflected by the fact that political struggles 
are fought on ethnic basic, and tendency of every 
political issue to be perceived in ethnic term (see: 
Zakaria Ahmad, 1989; Crouch, 1996). This is the 
prevailing phenomenon in Malaysian polity since 
its independence in 1957. Armd its relative sta- 
bility and rapid economic development, especially 
over the past two decades, Malaysia’s nation- 
building project has not been hlly accomplished, 
thus, constantly dominating the political agenda. 
Although there have been a proliferation 
in the study of ethnicity and nationalism in the 
West in recent years, a 111-length study that spe- 
cifically focus on the politics of nation-building 
in the post New Economic policy (NEP) 1970- 
1990 on Malaysia is hardly There were 
several studies on a similar subject in the past such 
as that Ratnam (1965); Ibrahim Saad (1976); 
Ongkili (1982); Wan Hashim (1983); and 
Abraham (1 997). However, these studies were 
mainly restricted to events that took place in Ma- 
laysia over the first two and a half decades of in- 
dependence, or between 1957 and the early 1980s. 
On the other hands, several contemporary writ- 
ings on the questions of Bangsa Malaysia and 
identity politics in Malaysia made by several lo- 
cal observers such as Rustam A. Sani (1993); 
Shamsul A.B. (1993; 1996a) Ghazali Shafie 
(1995); and Abdul Rahman Embong (1997), ap- 
parently did not deeply discuss on aspect of the 
politics of nation-building. Therefore these obser- 
vations need to be further scrutinised and deserved 
a more in-depth analysis as there have been tre- 
~ - 
* ‘Nation-of-intent’ was a concept first employed by Rothberg (1966) in his study of ‘African Nationalism’ and 
applied to the Malaysian context by Rustam A. Sani (1 975) in his study of the ‘Malay Left”. The concept was 
further expanded by Shamsul A.B. in debating about ‘identity in Malaysia. 
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mendous socio-economic and political changes 
affecting the country, particularly in the last de- 
cades, of Mahath’s political reign. One observer 
perceived that Mahathir’s ‘ , . .ideology, politics and 
personalities have contributed to reshaping the 
Malaysian polity.. . ’ (Khoo Boo Te& 1995:x).The 
question is, to what extend there exist a kind of 
‘Mahathirism’ which has significantly affect the 
politics of nation-building in gestures, since he 
came to power. Obviously, these new and impor- 
tant developments deserved fiesh investigations. 
A review of the literature suggests that the 
NEP and socio engineering programmes have 
made a significant unpact socio-economically, on 
the landscape of Malaysia. To what extent this is 
affecting the short and long-term political param- 
eters of ethnicity and nationalism would certamly 
constitute an interesting matter to look into. In the 
early 1990’s Malaysia was experiencing tremen- 
dous economic growth. However, together with 
its other Southeast Asian neighbours, they were 
shaken by Asian economic crisis in 1997, which 
severely affected the region. The economic crisis 
of 1997 has then turned into a political turmoil in 
1998 in several countries, and Malaysia is no ex- 
ception. The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim- the popu- 
lar Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and, po- 
litical crisis that erupted following his shocking 
removal from office was the case in point. This 
occurred at the time Malaysia was steadily mov- 
ing towards promoting its Vision 2020 agenda, 
which embodied the idea of constructing the 
Bangsa Malaysia. Although aspects of the twin 
* crises do not constitute the core focus of the pa- 
per, it is hoped that it would provide insights and 
new perspectives in assessing the effect and di- 
mensions of the crises on problems of nation for- 
mation as well as prospects for future trend in 
Malaysian politics. 
The main objective of this paper is to ex- 
arnine the delicate process of nation-building in 
the post 1970’s especially in the context of the 
vision constructing the Bangsa Malaysia or ‘united 
Malaysian nation’ which was forrnally introduced 
in 199 1. The key interest of the paper is to outline 
the underlying socio-political parameters that 
shaped and influenced the politics of nation-build- 
ing in the country. It is also sought to trace the 
extent to which shift was occurring from ethnicism 
to a Malaysian nationalism facilitated by the no- 
tion of Bangsa Malaysia. It is argued that the crux 
of the problem lies in the potent interplay of the 
forces of ethnicity and nationalism, which ulti- 
mately characterised Malaysian political life. This 
is the central argument of the paper. 
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING 
As far as demographic composition is corcerned, 
Malaysian society is very diversified. The Malays 
and other indigenous communities who consti- 
tuted about 60 percent of the population are clas- 
sified as Bumiputera (1it.sons of the soil, and en- 
joy certain privileges as stipulated under the Ma- 
laysian con~titution).~ On the other hand, ethnic 
Chinese who made up about 37 percent and In- 
dian communities who contributed the remaining 
11 percent. These two groups were classified as 
non-Bumiputera. None of these groups are ho- 
mogenous, being made up of peoples with vary- 
ing languages and religions. Whilst the Malays 
are all Muslims and speak Malay language, other 
Bumiputera communities especially in the two 
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak practise dif- 
fering religions and have their respective ethnic 
languages, On the other hand, the Indians are 
mainly Hindus and speak Tamil, whlst the reli- 
gious and language backgrounds of the Chinese 
are much more complicated. The religion and lan- 
guage divisions inMalaysia, therefore, OCCUT both 
within and across ethnic groups. In spite of the 
general increase in population, from about 10 
million in 1970 to approximately 22 million in 
‘ The terms Malay and Bumiputera, which are used in Malaysia often in the context of affirmative action programmes 
may at times cause confusion. Legally speaking, the term Bumiputera is referred to the indigeneous communities 
in Sabah and Sarawak, majority of which are non-Muslim. The term Malay used refers to ethnic Malay in the 
Peninsular who are Muslims. The small minority of the indigenous communities in the Peninsular is classified as 
the Orang Asli. However, during the NEP period ( I  971 - 1990), the term Bumiputera has been widely used by the 
government in policy documents as well as in idiom of everyday interaction to connote all the indigenous communities 
in Malaysia including the Malays. 
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2000 as indicated in the censuses of 1970, 1980, 
1990, ethnic composition in Malaysia has not 
changed significantly. As far as nation-building is 
concerned, it is the Bumiputera and non- 
Burniputera e b c  dlvide that is perceived as most 
important by many Malaysians as it illustrates the 
delicate demographic balance between the two 
categories, each constituting about half of the 
population (Shamsul A.B., 1996a;323). And 
withn this division, it is the Sino-Malay relations 
that is perceived as most crucial as reflected in 
the socio-political development and tend to domi- 
nate the politics of nation-building in Malaysia. 
For Malaysia, nation-building has been the 
single most crucial national agenda since its in- 
ception as a sovereign state in 1957. Almost all 
key national policies devised since then have a 
direct bearing on the questions of nation-build- 
ing. Nevertheless in as much as these policies were 
hoped to redress the related problems of national 
integration, new challenges cropped up and even 
more problematic. In 1991 Prime Minister, Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad unveiled the so-called Vision 
2020, which simply means that in the year 2020 
the government wants Malaysia to be an 
industrialised country in its own mould (Mahathir 
Mohamad, 1991). Of great interests in the project 
Vision 2020 is the list of nine challenges and ob- 
stacles that Malaysia has to overcome to translate 
it into reality. On top of the list is the creation of 
so-called Bangsa Malaysia, or ‘united Malaysian 
nation’. Apparently h s  was the first time the gov- 
ernment oflicially put forward a clear vision for 
constructing ‘a nation’ or Bangsa Malaysia. With 
that, it clearly d e r s  previous attempt over the past 
forty years of con.tructing national integration 
lacks a coherent focus and thus has not been fully 
achieved. 
ETHNICITY NATIONALISM AND 
TKE THEORETICAL LINKAGES 
NATION-BUILDING: 
The rhetoric of nation-building has emerged as 
an essential agenda in most plural societies as the 
state sought to neutralise competing e h c  ide- 
ologies of nationhood. A plural society is one in 
whch politics is e h c i s e d ,  in whch political com- 
petition is overtly drawn along ethnic lines. 
Whereas sustainable economic development and 
democracy may to some extent dif ise  the politi- 
cal salience of ethnicity, it is wrong to suggest they 
will lead to the elimination of ethnicity. Eriksen, 
1993 : 1 5 8) argued that ethnic revitalization has 
been an inherent feature of modernity, thus ‘the 
eventual disappearance of ethnicity is no less cer- 
tain than its appearance’ (Eriksen, 1993: 160). To 
him, ‘ethnicity does not necessarily arise from 
modernity, and it is not necessarily an end-prod- 
uct’ (p. 158). Therefore, although people tend to 
share many modern and cosmopolitan cultural 
values as a result of modernization, industrializa- 
tion, and democratization, they simultaneously 
become socially more diversified. Ethnicity, with- 
out doubt, is one prevalent expressions of that di- 
versification. Clearly, as Geller put it, modern so- 
ciety is both more homogeneous and more diver- 
sified.. . ’ (Gellner, 1978: 141) 
What make ethnicity and nationalism po- 
litically salient as far as nation-building in divided 
societies is concerned? The significance of 
ethnicity lies in its salience for group conscious- 
ness and collective political actions. People are 
willing to die for their collective ‘nation’, simply 
because of the powerful appeal and persistence 
of ethnic identity and sentiment (Anderson, 
1996a). Ethnic identity provides a tangible set of 
common identifications-language, food, music, 
names-when other social collectivities become 
more abstract and impersonal (Bell, 1975). There- 
fore, psychologically, it has one advantage over 
the other modes of personal identity and social 
linkages, through its capacity to arouse and to en- 
gage the most intense, deep and private emotional 
sentiments of the people (see: Fortz, 1974: 105). 
In t h ~ s  regards, the moment ethnic identity is per- 
ceived as being driven into a situation of threat, it 
explains why there is strong tendency for ethnic 
revitalization movements to emerge. 
Identity as crucial mark of distinctiveness 
is the force behind ethnic consciousness and, in 
many cases ethmc groups enter into politics pur- 
portedly to protect themselves fiom or rather to 
resist the perceived threat of domination from 
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other ethnic groups, which might result in the di- 
lution of their e t h c  identity (the very mark of 
distinctiveness). As ethnic groups transform them- 
selves into political conflict groups for the pur- 
pose of articulating its interest, the emotional in- 
tensity of their internal ethnic cohesion arises and 
e t h c  solidarity and consciousness will be en- 
hanced. From t h ~ s  premise, it appears that e h c i t y  
does not exist in isolation but rather is a conse- 
quences of contact and conflict. According to ‘the 
ethicist paradigm’ (Smith, 1996) e thci ty  is some- 
thing ‘mythic’ and ‘symbolic’ in character and 
derived its powerfbl appeal fiom aspect of a ‘com- 
mon past’. However, the relevant aspect of ‘com- 
mon past’ here refers to ‘order collective ties’ 
(Smith, 1986) and not necessary or exclusively to 
a product of hstory (Nash, 1989: Shamsul A.B., 
1996a) or modernization and industrialization 
(Gellner, 1983). It is argued that, whereas ethnic 
groups are characterized by a multiplicity of at- 
tributes, namely common descent, shared history, 
language, religion, race, colour culture, sect, caste 
and so on, ethnicity is basically an aspect of so- 
groups in a given socio-political setting. 
l, cial relationships between one or more ethnic 
may have a h e c t  bearing on the emergence of 
ethmc consciousness, but it is only when cultural 
differences make a social difference do they lead 
to the creation of ethnicity. The question of pro- 
By the same token, cultural peculiarities 
I 
I 
I 
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tecting one’s cultural traits may not arise unless 
there exist elements of cultural domination and 
* threat from another culture. Nevertheless, living 
with dual or multiple identities does not always 
constitute a problem. It does create some dificul- 
ties when one is expected to have a clearly delin- 
eated identity. This is part of the problem that pre- 
vails in plural societies, which consequently 
makes the project of nation-formation a difficult 
task. The problem lies in the conflict between pro- 
tecting ethnic distinctiveness or identity vis-a-vis 
subscribing to national identity. Ethnic identities, 
and the belief in shared cultures and history, how- 
ever are not perpetual. Instead, they are creations, 
which may result fiom specific historical circum- 
stances, strategic actors or as unintended conse- 
quences of political projects (Eriksen, 1993:92). 
Identity, in this regard is not static but rather is 
dynamic, and is prone to constant change in ac- 
cordance with changes in social and political en- 
vironments. Identity is fluid and situational. The 
problem that prevails in many divided societies is 
that, while e h u c  identities may constantly change, 
the people are still strongly attached to their col- 
lective ethnic identities, in contrast to national 
identity, which has yet to be developed. 
The crucial linkages between e thc i ty  and 
nationalism lie in the state. That is, nationalism 
emerges when there is an . . . institutionalization 
of one particular ethnic identity attaching it to the 
state (Worsely, 1984:247). Whereas a state in con- 
temporary politics is defined as having (1) a geo- 
graphical area endowed with political sovereignty, 
(2) a monopoly on the use of force; and (3) con- 
sisting of citizens with terminal loyalties 
(Oommen, 1994:26), a nation derives fiom the 
people’s relationship to and identification with the 
state. Where there exists a relatively strong, co- 
hesive and common identification between the 
people and the state, then a nation-state is argu- 
able created. In this regard, national identity or 
collective culture llnks together the people and 
the state to create a nation-state. The most com- 
mon feature of a modern nation state can be in 
seen Europe, where a nation (a cultural entity) co- 
exists with the state (a political entity) thus creat- 
ing many distinctive Europe nation-states 
(Oommen, 1994). These states are basically a 
composition of both cultural and political nations, 
which emerges through a long process of the 
ethnogenesis of the nation. 
However, many developing countries have 
been formed as a consequence of decolonisation. 
They are largely independent states created out 
of the territories, which were under European co- 
lonial administration. Their boundaries were 
drawn, as Hobsbawm (1 990: 17 1) explains, with- 
out any reference to, and sometimes without the 
knowledge of their peoples, except perhaps for 
some Westernized aristocrats. For Malaysia, its 
geographical boundaries were delineated by com- 
mon consent through a process negotiation. In the 
Peninsula, the common factor is provided by rec- 
ognition of the federation of Malay states as the 
basic for the ‘new state’. After departure of the 
colonial masters, the ruling elites inherited the 
state, but without having ‘a united union’. Instead, 
they had to grapple with the problems of govern- 
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ing a state in which the society was multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural. 
By the time of independence, the Malay 
states had already been changed through linkages 
instituted by the British. Above all, the composi- 
tion of the population had also changed, so that 
common descent could not be the basis of national 
identity and unity. The presence of citizens of dif- 
fering ethnic m,d cultural origins requires the for- 
mulation of a new basis for the national identity. 
The basic problem with which Malaysia (and 
many other states with similar characteristics) 
have to cope has been the prevalence of strong 
and conspicuous identification of its people with 
other social collectivities (especially ethnic and 
tribal groups) in contrast to common identifica- 
tion with the state. In other words, their national 
identity is still weak in comparison to their ethnic 
identities. This also implies that whereas the citi- 
zens can identify with the state politically because 
of their citizenshp status, they may not identify 
strongly with it culturally. This is a crucial prob- 
lem in the development of national culture and 
identity in Malaysia. 
Hence, if Malaysians envisage the ‘nation’, 
it will tend to be a political nation rather than a 
‘cultural nation’. This is a possible alternative to 
avoid the controversy of being an ethnic nation, 
while awaiting the long process of ethnogenesis 
of the nation to bring about the creation of the 
‘ethno-cultural nation’. This is the significant con- 
trast between these ‘nations’ and other nation- 
states such as those of many European nation- 
states. Therefore, countries such as Malaysia can 
be regarded as states with ‘several nations’ 
(Sh&ul A.B., 1992) or ‘plural society nations’ 
because of their mulFationa1 or multi-etbmc com- 
position. Thus, there was a suggestion that these 
states be called ‘state-nations’ rather than nation- 
states (Leo Suryadinata, 1997). What tends to 
constitute a persistent problem in these states has 
been the assertion of ethnic identities in national 
terms, thus signifying a ‘danger’ to the state and 
often ‘perceived’ as posing a similar threat to other 
e t h c  communities. 
Quite often, the state itself is not a neutral 
entity, as it may have been ’seized’ to serve the 
specific motives and agendas of a particular po- 
litical elite or e b c  group. Political life in the 
state thus sometimes reflect the struggle of vari- 
ous social groupings ‘against’ the state, which was 
perceived as attempting to hinder their legitimate 
interests, a persistent phenomenon llkened to the 
‘Hobbesian state’. With such a backdrop, the state- 
nations itself tends to be a very fiagile institution. 
Although political violence or anarchy m y  not 
necessarily be a persistent phenomenon, these 
societies probably can be best described as ‘states 
in stable tension’ (Shamsul A.B., 1996a). Hence, 
in a conscious attempt to preserve the sovereignty 
and the integrity of the state, political regimes in 
divided societies tend to succumb into political 
authoritarianism or make use of ‘quasi-demo- 
cratic’ systems as an alternative to western style 
liberal democracy (see: Crouch, 1996; Zakaria 
Ahmad, 1989). 
Starting with an authoritarian system, those 
who control or dominate the state tend to manipu- 
late its apparatus to propagate nation-building as 
an e t h c  project or present the nation-state in eth- 
nic terms. In other words, the country’s nation 
formation is to be based on a particular ethnic iden- 
tity. Which consequently implies that other eth- 
nic communities will inevitably have to accept a 
predetermined national identity at the expense of 
their own ethnic identities. This type of nation 
formation encourages ethnic and cultural revital- 
ization on the part of the affected groups to resist 
the cultural and political hegemony of the domi- 
nant ethnic group. For some other states whose 
internal political structures have been established 
on the framework of consociational democracy, 
the persistent dilemma has been to maintain plu- 
ralism while simultaneously moving towards the 
construction of national identity, and hence na- 
tion formation. Malaysia has been facing most of 
these problems since its inception as a modern 
independent state in 1957. 
Moving to the question of nationalism, it 
is argued that nationalism emerges as a form of 
ethnicity or rather as Smith (1986) perceives, 
‘ethnicity is a precursor of nationalism’. Although 
Smith ( 19 83) argues that nationalism may emerge 
with or without a nation, Gellner (1983) believes 
that nationalism ‘invents nations where they do 
not exist.’ This score implies that without nation- 
alism, the nation is perhaps much more difficult 
to conceive. Therefore, in the context of countries 
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in which their ‘nations’ are in-the-making, it is 
crucial that nationalism is constantly developed 
to promote a sense of nationhood amongst its citi- 
zens. But since nationalism is deeply embedded 
in ethno-symbolic base, the question is whch eth- 
nic identity should constitute the basis for nation- 
alism in divided societies? 
In Malaysia, the Malays felt that Malay 
nationalism that matured in 1957 should be the 
basis for the country’s nationalism, as other na- 
tionalism were externally oriented (pre-indepen- 
dence Chinese and Indian nationalism in Malaya). 
However, the non-Malays were sceptical about 
h s  view, as they saw that accepting Malay na- 
tionalism and its hegemonic tendencies might re- 
sult in the encapsulation of other ethnic commu- 
nities into Malay society. This is something that 
would ultimately undermine the culturally plural- 
ist basis ofthe polity that was established in 1957. 
For the Malays, their intention to subordinate other 
ethnic communities into the framework of ‘Malay 
nation-state’ was obstructed by the consociational 
framework that anchored the political system. This 
system is based on power sharing mechanism in 
whch every ethmc groups attempt to seek maxi- 
mum power to protect their interest and influence 
national policies. Therefore, ethnic struggle in ths  
connection may not be so much about political 
independence, but rather about getting some lim- 
ited objectives pertaining to economics, cultural, 
religious, linguistics, and so on within the fiame- 
work of the existing state. These illustrate the 
notions of efhnrc ideology of nationhood held by 
each individual ethnic group. Perhaps, this might 
be the same,factor that ‘saved’ Malaysia from 
plummeting into endless ethnic confrontations, as 
the system provides adequate space for conflict 
regulation, despite being severely challenged in 
the 1969 racial riots. 
While consociational democracy may pro- 
vide certain tangible mechanisms for conflict 
management, it has, however, certain outstand- 
ing flaws. The dangers for this system may lie in 
(1) the failure ofmulti-ethzllc national elite to reach 
political accommodation or compromise (2) the 
failure of ethnic elite at the national level to gain 
adequate or continuous support fiom ethnic groups 
that they represent; and (3) the threat of moderate 
national ethnic elite being severely challenged by 
the extremist and radical forces within and out- 
side their own ethnic groups (see Lijphart, 1977; 
Horowitz, 1985). These challenges have posed 
serious threats to Malaysian consociationalism, 
which brought the system to near collapse in the 
1969 racial riots. However, the systemwas revived 
in 1974 with the establishment of the Barisan 
Nasional grand coalition which is a bigger, more 
representative and thus a more stable consocia- 
tional structure. Nevertheless, to provide a more 
lasting stability, the country still needs to find a 
permanent solution through the nation-building 
agenda. The biggest challenge is to formulate the 
most acceptable framework for mediating identi- 
ties, so that it can accommodate all the essential 
interests of major ethnic groups in the society. 
In short, there is no simple solution to alle- 
viate the effect of ethmc, religious or linguistic 
cleavages in plural societies. Without consensus, 
a radical and coercive approach in nation-build- 
ing often may result in a setback. Neither ethnic 
cleavages nor ethnic nationalism can be easily 
managed single handedly. State intervention may 
only resolve part of the problem. But over inter- 
vention by the state in the nation-building project 
may result in the state being regarded as a tool to 
advance the interests of a particular ethnic group. 
However, it is much more reasonable for the gov- 
ernment to embark upon programme towards 
minimising ethnic grievances in politics and socio- 
economics spheres, while simultaneously promot- 
ing ‘state nationalism’ or ‘civic nati~nalism’~ , a 
vision of common destiny, and universal cultural 
values among all the ethnic groups. The most 
important is to pursue the project of nation for- 
mation on the basis of national consensus but the 
big question is how could these be attained with- 
out prejudice or implying that nation-building 
The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism tend to be a problematic one in the sense that one cannot 
simply equate civic nationalism as good and all ethnic nationalisms as bad. David Brown (1 999) argued that civic 
nationalism might also develop in either liberal or illiberal directions depending upon how effectively its visions of 
civic community are employed by the mobilizing elites to resolve societal aspirations or fears. 
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agenda is not heading towards an ethnic project? 
Obviously the debates so far indicate that nation 
building as argued by Atal(l98 1 :23) is 
a complex phenomenon, simplistic 
answers do not explain its intricate 
patterns, nor can one trust the 
many proffered panaceas for 
instant nation-building. It is a 
journey towards the desirable but 
the unknown, with several built-in 
handicaps all along the road. 
THE POLITICS OF 
MANAGING ETHNICITY AND 
CONSOLIDATING NATIONALISM 
NATION-BUILDING IN MALAYSIA: 
History has shown that Malaysia is never short of 
nationalist ideals to form the basis of a nation. 
Indeed, the country’s independence was largely 
attributed to the struggle of Malay nationalism. 
However, w i h  Malay nationalist movements of 
the pre-independence era there were clear ideo- 
logical divisions between the radical and conser- 
vative groups (W.R. Roff, 1994; Ariffn Omar, 
1993; Ikmal Said, 1992; Firdaus Abdullah, 1985). 
Even after the conservative-nationalist group rep- 
resented by UMNO managed to dominate the post 
independence Malaysian politics, the aspiration 
of creating a Malay nation-state has not been ma- 
terialized. Instead, the nationalists had to compro- 
mise  to the creation of ‘a plural society nation’ 
when independence was granted in 1957 and 
shared power with,the non-Malays, who were 
mainly immigrant communities then had settled 
in the colonial Malaya in the 19” century. Never- 
theless, despite the creation of a power sharing 
mechanism at the Federal level which illustrates 
the formation of Malaysia’s model of consocia- 
tional democracy, Malay political supremacy was 
reconstituted, enshrined in UMNO as the back- 
bone of the Alliance ( 1957- 1974) and later the BN 
coalition government. Malay centric or rather 
UMNO centric government has been the hallmark 
of Malaysian politics. Thus, in contrast to the 
‘ideal consociationalism’ arrangement (Lipjhart, 
1977), the system in Malaysia can be considered 
as a system of ‘hegemonic consociationalism’ 
(Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 18). Whilst the Malays 
are politically dominant, the non-Malays, espe- 
cially the Chinese are economically superior. This 
delicate balance or perhaps an outstanding discrep- 
ancy has further complicated the project of nation 
formation in the country. 
Politically, Chan and Ever (1973:303-4) 
argued that in many Southeast Asian countries 
there were two alternatives adopted in deahg with 
the problems of nation-building. One was to re- 
sort to the ‘regressive’ identity by reviving a long 
and proud cultural tradition through an appeal to 
the ‘golden past’. The other was a ‘progressive’ 
identity, culminating an ameliorative programme 
of building a society by dxcarding its feudal or 
colonial shackles in which one such option lay in 
establishing a socialist state. For Malaysia both 
approaches were attempted, yet neither were suc- 
cessfully materialized. Attempt by the communist 
(the MCP) to create a ‘progressive’ identity 
through the realisation of a socialist state in Ma- 
laysia was rejected by the Malays, as its struggle 
was incompatible with their hstorical, cultural and 
religious identities. Discarding feudal and colo- 
nial bondages that have been strongly embedded 
in the system in order to allow the establishment 
of a socialist or a communist state would result in 
the elimination of Malay e t h c  identifiers namely 
the bahasa, agama and the raja. Moreover, the 
MCP was an organisation dominated by the Chi- 
nese. Therefore, the communists agenda was seen 
by the Malays as Chinese struggle which was per- 
ceived as incompatible with their cultural identi- 
ties and political interests, On the other hand, at- 
tempts by Malay nationalists to revive a long and 
proud Malay cultural traditions culminated in the 
creation of a Malay nation-state was denied by 
the British as it was opposed by the non-Malays 
especially the economically superior ethnic Chi- 
nese. Whle Malay historical and political su- 
premacy was recognized, a new independent state 
of 1957 was based on the principle of multi-eth- 
nic society that would allow the diverse ethnic 
and cultural elements to co-exist along each other. 
The post-independence era, saw that 
Malay hegemony has been fiercely challenged by 
the non-Malays. They felt that Malay dominant 
thesis was an ideology that served to dominate 
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them, hence perceived that there were conscious 
attempts by the nationalists to turn nation-build- 
ing as an ethnic project which will ultimately 
threaten their ethnic identities and the basis of the 
‘plural society nation’. This partly explained the 
reasons behmd the non-Malays opposition to the 
national language and education policy in the 
1950’s- 1960’s, and the national cultural policy that 
was introduced in 197 1. Apart fiom that, the post- 
independence Malay nationalism has also to cope 
with challenges fiom other factions withn Malay 
and Bumiputera communities who espoused the 
notion of an Islamic state; and notions of 
Kadazanism and Dayakism as the definitive iden- 
tities in the two Borneo states of Sabah and 
Sarawak respectively. Nation-building in Malay- 
sia thus could be seen as a struggle of every eth- 
nic groups against the state (read a Malay centric 
state) on one hand, and on the other, against each 
others to materialise their respective versions of a 
’nation’. But the most obvious contestation was 
between Malay vis-a-vis the non-Malay groups 
anchored by the Chinese. This is the most salient 
struggle which had left several damaging politi- 
cal scars to Malaysian society, the worst culmi- 
nated in the 1969 racial riots. This is also a 
struggle, whch formed the basic characteristic of 
Malaysian politics. 
Since the 1969 tragedy, Malaysian politi- 
cal system however has been able to absorb vari- 
ous threats to its stability. To some extent, this 
indicates that the once perceived very fragile sys- 
tem of Malaysia’s consociational democracy has 
been gaining momentum since the formation of 
the BN coalition government in 1974. Apart fiom 
that, the state generated ‘stability’ can also be at- 
tributed to various strategies of depoliticisation 
that marked the growing political authoritarianism 
in Malaysia (see Crouch, 1996; Khoo Boo Teik, 
1997). Despite the various criticism to its demo- 
cratic practices, the government since the imple- 
mentation of the NEP in 1970 has been able to 
embark upon affirmative action programmes to 
tackle the problems of ethnic imbalances in the 
soci&economic fields, especially in rectifying the 
Bumiputeras’ economic backwardness. While 
these measures have made some positive results, 
the project of nation formation is still far from 
being resolved. Ethnic politics is still a major 
threat to the system continued stability, and gov- 
ernment leaders have constantly reiterated that 
managing ethnic conflicts and moving towards 
national integration always constitute a primary 
national agenda. 
That was a backdrop against which the 
notion of Bangsa Malaysia was introduced in 
1991. Whereas the objective of the project may 
well be easily understood, Bangsa Malaysia, how- 
ever, is a problematic concept. On one hand, its 
operational definition is still vague to many Ma- 
laysians, while on the other, its viability as a for- 
mula to resolve the national predicament in 
Malaysia’s plural society may arouse as much 
ambiguity as its’meaning. While the country was 
enjoying constant economic growth since the late 
1980’s, in July 1997 what was later known an 
Asian economic meltdown, has severely disrupted 
Malaysia’s relative stability and thus eclipsed its 
economic success story. Malaysia has not only had 
to grapple with the economic downturn, but worst 
still, a year later the country was plunged into a 
political crisis following the abrupt dismissal of 
Anwar Ibrahim, then the country’s popular Deputy 
Prime Minister, who was widely seen as 
Mahathir ’s heir-apparent. 
The twin crises have left damaging politi- 
cal consequences not only for Mahathir’s leader- 
ship, but beyond that the ruling party or rather 
more specifically W O ,  suffered serious politi- 
cal setback as depicted in the November 1999 gen- 
eral election. Although the BN retained its two 
third majority at the Federal Parliament, UMNO 
power-base has been seriously eroded by the Op- 
position Front, the Barisan Alternatif led by PAS. 
Indeed, PAS was the greatest beneficiary of the 
1997-98 economic and political crises. Apart fiom 
retaining Kelantan, Pas was able to capture 
Terengganu and also made significant in-road into 
several other states such as Kedah, Pahang, 
Selangor and Perak. The 1999 the general elec- 
tion clearly indicated that UMNO was largely re- 
jected by the Malays; its traditional power-base, 
and now had to count on the non-Malays in order 
to remain in power. To what extent UMNO could 
regain its influence among the Malays, especially 
the younger generations and the middle class, be- 
fore the next general election remain to been seen. 
Obviously, all these new developments would 
have significant effects on the project of nation- 
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building in Malaysia, thus constituting a new di- 
mension to look into as far as the politics of 
e h c i t y  and nationalism in Malaysia is concerned. 
Despite some tensions between the federal 
government and several state governments, eth- 
nic struggle in Malaysia has largely taken place 
w i h n  existing political boundaries, whereby each 
ethnic group trying to seek maximum power to 
protect their interests. PAS, which ruled the state 
of Kelantan from 1959-1978, and fiom 1990 to 
the present, has confined itself to attempting to 
portray the Islamic ‘holier than thou’ approach in 
governing the state vis-a-vis the perceived UMNO 
‘secular-nationalist ideology’. Although PAS has 
been propagating the notion of ‘Islamic-nation- 
state’, it has not been able to achieve its goal, due 
to constitutional limitation. PAS needs to amend 
the Federal Constitution in order to allow Kelantan 
and Terengganu to become ‘model’ of Islamic 
states, a legislative battle which it has been un- 
able to win given the BN domination of the Fed- 
eral Parliament. Moreover, the non-Muslim com- 
munities who constituted around 40 percent of the 
population are yet to be convinced by PAS con- 
cept of universal justice through the establishment 
of an Islamic state. In Sabah the PBS regime from 
1985-1991 only attempted to reconstruct the no- 
tion of Malay-based Bumiputeraism into 
Kadazan-based Bumiputeraism in that particular 
state. Kadazan nationalism is more of a political 
expression of socio-economic and cultural depri- 
vation of the Kadazan communities than a politi- 
cal nationalism per se. Likewise, Ibanism or 
Dayakism in Sarawak have a similar characteris- 
tics. The success of the BN to topple the PBS-led 
government in 19& after several of the former 
state representatives hopped into the BN and re- 
gained its power in the 1999 Sabah election ap- 
parently ‘halted’ the wave of Kadazan national- 
ism for the time being. In Sarawak, however, the 
strong BN leadership of Tan Sri Taib Mahmud 
has been able to curb Dayalusm from gaining its 
strength similar to that of Kadazanism.6 
While the New Economic Policy (NEP 
1970-1990) has made a number of significant 
impacts in terms of rectifying socio-economic dis- 
parities between the Bumiputera and non- 
Bumiputera communities, the framework of na- 
tion formation embodied in the policy did not tran- 
scend the premise of conflict management and 
racial hannony. On the contrary, the Bumiputera- 
non-Bumiputera dichotomy that was created dur- 
ing the NEP period has further deepened ethnic 
differentiation in the society. For non-Bumiputera, 
the question was why the new Malaysian genera- 
tion who were supposed to have equal citizenship 
rights and status had to carry the burden of the 
hstorical baggage of previous generations that 
clearly affected their current position. In turn, the 
Malays argued that, the compromy was based on 
a ‘sacred social contract’ between the founding 
fathers of the country in 1957 which had set the 
basis of every citizen’s constitutional rights. Ob- 
viously the institutionalization of ethnicity seems 
to be the core factor in such a debate, and will 
inevitably continue to be so, as long as the debate 
on national identity and nation formation is not 
resolved. 
Whereas the Malays were concerned about 
sustaining Malayness and strengthening Malay- 
Islamic hegemony as well as improving their eco- 
nomic gains, the Chinese fear was the perceived 
threat to Clunese culture and Chmese language, 
the defining features of Chineseness, from the 
exertion of the Malay or Islamic dominant ide- 
ologies. Although Wang Gung Wu (1988:4) as- 
serts that, ‘the Chinese have never had a concept 
of identity, only a concept of Chineseness’, the 
perceived threats to aspects of their ‘Chineseness’ 
such as Chinese language and culture, be it real 
or imaginary, that came from Malay nationalism 
and Islamism had resulted in the revitalization of 
Chnese cultural movements to project Chnese 
identity. For ethnic Chinese, the symbols of their 
identity lie in Chmese schools, the Chinese mass 
media (especially the press), and Chinese asso- 
ciations (see: Leo Suryadinata, 1997). The main 
functions of all these institutions are to promote 
Chinese language and culture, thus sustaining 
Chineseness. Therefore, as long as the basis of 
cultural pluralism is maintained in Malaysia, the 
Chinese and the other non-Malays’ aspirations to 
In contrast to the Kadazans, the Day& communities are disunited and their resources limited. Therefore, Dayakism 
as political movement has not been successfully mobilised (See: Jayum, 1994; and Mohamed Mustafa Ishak, 1999) 
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sustain their distinctive ethnic identities will be 
guaranteed. 
In the wider context, Vision 2020 the ulti- 
mate goal of which was to create ‘a united and an 
industrialized Malaysian nation in its own mould’, 
can be seen as an attempt to reconstruct Malay- 
sian nationalism on the basis of ‘secular-materi- 
alist’ components. However, the notion of Bangsa 
Malaysia embodied in the project has yet to be 
clearly spelled out. The definition of the concept 
is still open to various interpretation, and there- 
fore could mean different things to different 
people. This clearly reflects the conflicting per- 
ception of what ‘Malaysian nation’ should repre- 
sent. For the large majority of Malaysians, the 
concept is still vague and perhaps an ambiguous 
notion. Every ethnic cornunity hoped that their 
social, cultural and political aspirations would be 
embedded in the concept of Bangsa Malaysia. On 
the other hand, several policy speeches made by 
government leaders concerning Bangsa Malaysia 
also had not been clearly elaborated the meaning 
of the concept. A number of speeches made by 
Dr. M a h a h  since 1998 Concerning the meaning 
of the concept of Bangsa Malaysia indicated that 
he only insisted that Bangsa Malaysia as ‘the 
people who are able to identify themselves with 
the country, speak Bahasa Malaysia and accept 
the Constitution,’ but will ‘remain as Chmese or 
Indians or Ibans or Kadazans or Muruts and so 
forth’. In short, Mahathir states that a Malaysian 
will only be a ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ in the form ‘po- 
litical identity’ and therefore will not lose their 
respective ethnic languages or cultures (see: 
Mohamed Mustsa Ishak, 1999). 
With the introduction of the idea of Bangsa 
Malaysia, the government can be seen as attempt- 
ing to formulate a middle ground through the con- 
solidation of Malay nationalism and cultural plu- 
ralism, thus depicting the nation as ‘a mosaic of 
different cultures ’ and creating a supra-ethc na- 
tional identity. By so doing, it tacitly sought to 
downplay the ‘ethno-cultural dialectic’ that 
strongly prevails in Malaysian society. Neverthe- 
less, depicting the ‘nation’ as a ‘mosaic of cul- 
tures’ is easier than living in such a mosaic. Cre- 
ating the united ‘nation’ out of distinct ethnic cul- 
tures is a difficult matter. The problem for this 
framework lies in its emphasis on differences 
rather than similarities. The notion of Bangsa Ma- 
laysia has brought with it several fundamental 
questions yet to be addressed. The first and fore- 
most is, to what extent the philosophy of ‘unity in 
diversity’ brought by the notion of Bangsa Ma- 
laysia is going to be viable basis for creating a 
‘united Malaysian nation’? The second is, before 
this venture can be endorsed, Malaysians may 
need to know what criteria are to be used to bal- 
ance Malay nationalism with the notion of cul- 
tural pluralism in the formation of the character- 
istics of the Bangsa Malaysia? Answering these 
questions may trigger another cultural-political 
‘battle’ between the major ethnic groups. The 
battle is likely to be a multi-dimensional one, that 
is a struggle between Malay nationalism, Islam, 
Bumiputeraism (Kadazanism and Dayakism), and 
cultural pluralism. 
Since the notion of Bangsa Malaysia re- 
mains rather vague to the people at large, and the 
debates over what should constitute the core char- 
acteristics of the envisaged ‘nation’ are still very 
much alive, the project remains both conceptu- 
ally and practically problematic. Bangsa Malay- 
sia can therefore only be envisaged in political 
terms rather than cultural terms. Given the domi- 
nance of competing ethruc ideas of a nation within 
Malaysia’s pluralistic socio-political settings, the 
notion of Bangsa Malaysia may simply prove the 
latest in a series of different nation-of-intent which 
have been articulated in post-independence Ma- 
laysia. Looking from this perspective, it is argued 
that the forces of ethnicity and nationalism will 
remain crucial in shaping and influencing the 
mechanics and the dynamics of the politics of 
nation-building in Malaysia for many years to 
come. 
In one way or another, Bangsa Malaysia 
is tied to UMNO ‘pragmatic-secularist politics’. 
UMNO is fully aware that based on the non-Mus- 
lims’ difficulties in adapting to Islam in compari- 
son to their willingness to adapt to the Malay lan- 
guage, the Raja and some elements of Malay cul- 
ture, Islam will always constitute a sensitive sub- 
jectas far as the Malay vis-a-vis non-Malay rela- 
tionshp is concerned. Therefore, although UMNO 
has claimed that the party is committed to Islam, 
the party has never proposed transforming the 
Malaysian semi-secular polity into an Islamic 
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theocratic state. Ttus has been the crux of the con- 
flict between UMNO and PAS which does envis- 
age an Islamic state. Bangsa Malaysia has been 
part of Mahathir’s grand vision of what a semi- 
secular Malaysian state should be in the year 2020. 
Until July 1997 the government, in par- 
ticular Mahathx’s leadership, seemed to enjoy a 
strong popular mandate given the continued sta- 
bility and rapid economic development the coun- 
try has been experiencing. Every ethnic cornmu- 
nity generally felt that it had been getting its re- 
spective portion of the country’s economic pros- 
perity. The landslide electoral victory secured by 
the BN in the 1995 general election illustrated ths  
widespread support backed by continuous eco- 
nomic growth, political stability, and strong popu- 
lar support. Mahathir ’s leadership and his grandi- 
ose visions seemed unaffected despite various 
criticisms leveled against his policies, and the 
government’s authoritarian tendencies. For more 
than a decade, Mahathir has been able to subdue 
his critics with Malaysia’s economic success, in- 
ternal cohesion and h s  high profile international 
reputation. Several attempts to challenge his 
power grip within UMNO itself ended in abject 
failure. 
However, when the country was severely 
hit by the 1997 economic crisis whch later turned 
into a political one, things began to change. The 
most serious criticism of his economic policies 
and grandiose projects were those of ‘crony capi- 
talism’ and the widespread of corruption in h s  
government. Even the new middle-class Malays 
who were basically the product of Mahathu’s eco- 
nomic policies begin to challengehis leadershp, 
especially with regard to the shocking dismissal 
of his popular deputy Anwar Ibrahim, and above 
all the ill-treatment that he received thereafter. 
Mahathx’s eighteen years grip on power has been 
seriously questioned. Mahathrr ’s leadership in the 
midst of the economic and political turmoil has 
divided Malaysians along ethmc lines. While the 
non-Malays, particularly the Chinese) believed 
that retaining M a h a h ’ s  leadershp and UMNO 
led government was crucial to prevent Malaysia 
from succumbing to a grim scenario similar to that 
of the Indonesian crisis, many Malays (especially 
fiom amongst the middle class and the younger 
generation) tended to see PAS as serious political 
alternative to UMNO. Indeed, support for PAS has 
been growing significantly since Anwar’s dis- 
missal, especially in the Malay heartland state of 
Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis as dem- 
onstrated in 1999 general election. In fact, the 
opposition parties seem to have been brought 
much closer together by forming an electoral pact 
as depicted in the last election. 
Although the government has been able 
to turn around the 1997- 1998 economic recession 
with some moderate growth recorded by mid- 1999 
through several unorthodox approaches such as 
that of capital contTol and fixed exchange rate 
policies, politically, the government, especially 
W O  is still struggling in its attempt to win back 
Malay voters who have supported PAS and its 
opposition pact during the last election. Such sce- 
nario if continued, will not only affect UMNO’s 
position as the backbone of the government, but 
of more crucial is the position of Malaysian con- 
sociational political arrangement, as moderate 
national elite, namely UMNO, are faced with 
daunting task of regaining their influence. If 
UMNO is weakened, would there be another po- 
litical party in the country capable of taking over- 
all control to maintain racial harmony in the coun- 
try? To what extent the post Mahathir leadershp 
in UMNO would be able to survive all these criti- 
cal challenges has yet to be seen. The relevant 
question to ask is: to what extent is the idea of 
Bangsa Malaysia going to survive beyond Dr. 
Mahathr’s political reign? In what manner Ma- 
laysian politics will evolve in the post Mahatlur 
era is yet another crucial question which will have 
a significant bearing on the project of nation-build- 
ing in the country. What is perhaps more or less 
certain is that e h c i t y  and nationalism will still 
be socially and politically salient in shaping and 
influencing the politics of nation-building in Ma- 
laysia for rnany years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that as far as the project of nation-build- 
ing in Malaysia is concerned, many of the shift 
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that were occurring in the system over the past 
four decades have been generated by the state. 
Although ethnicity still forms the very basis of 
Malaysian politics, its political salience in the post 
1990 period has been rather different to the situa- 
tion that prevailed in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The 
key factor was the prevalence of a relatively strong 
and stable consociational political regime with 
Malay leadership as its backbone. With that came 
the notion of Malay political hegemony, though 
the government since independence comprised 
representatives of multi-ethnic political coalition. 
A relatively strong government and stable politi- 
cal base has enabled efforts at generating eco- 
nomic development to yeld many fruitful out- 
comes. Constant economic growth has enabled the 
government to embark on attempts at redressing 
ethnic imbalances in various fields. Ethnic har- 
mony has been built through the sharing of eco- 
nomic wealth. In short, over the past four decades, 
sustainable economic development was seen as 
vital in promoting improved e h c  relations in 
the country. Ths will certainly remain the case in 
the future. 
The notion of Bangsa Malaysia illustrated 
that the project of nation formation was advanced 
as part of a package of economic development 
inherent in Vision 2020, that is, a plan to turn 
Malaysia into a fully industrialized country, Al- 
though the symbiotic relationship between eco- 
nomic development and the political salience of 
ethnicity is acknowledged, the success of the 
project of nation formation in Malaysia needs 
more than economic measures. Nationalism and 
national identity is nQt only about the economy, 
but beyond that embedded in a strong sense cul- 
ture and emotional ties. Establishmg these ties is 
perhaps much more difficult than economic de- 
velopment. In Mahathir ’s word: 
. . . building a nation out of diverse people 
with differing historical, ethnic, linguistic, reli- 
gious, cultural and geographical backgrounds is 
something more than just fostering consensus on 
the basic character of a state or nation. It involves 
the fostering of shared hstorical experiences; 
shared values; a feeling of common identity and 
shared destiny that transcends ethnic bounds with- 
out undermining ethnic identity; loyalty, commit- 
ment and an emotional attachments to the nation; 
and flowering of distinctly national ethos.. . 
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1992:2) 
In sum, it is argued that the potent inter- 
play between the forces of ethnicity and national- 
ism was the key factor behnd the ‘competing eth- 
nic ideologies of a nation’ to be created in Malay- 
sia. The politics of nation-building in Malaysia 
reflects the pulls in different directions of the com- 
peting ethnic ideologies of nationhood, both 
within and across ethnic groups. Thts was the most 
prominent element that has complicated the 
project of nation-building in the country over the 
past four decades. Although the socio-economic 
landscape of Malaysian society has been rapidly 
changing, ethnicity still prevails Malaysian po- 
litical life. The biggest threat for Malaysia may 
perhaps derive from extremism in the form of eth- 
nic, cultural and religious revitalization. Extrem- 
ism has had many awful repercussions in many 
parts of the country in the past, and will continue 
to re-emerge if the forces of e t h c i t y  are not prop- 
erly managed. Failure by the system to check 
emerging ethnic or religious extremism would 
constitute a setback for the project of nation-build- 
ing in Malaysia. 
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